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Abstract 
 
This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can better comply with 
theoretical predictions than individuals in contests. Our experiment replicates previous findings 
that individual players significantly overbid relative to theoretical predictions, incurring 
substantial losses. There is high variance in individual bids and strong heterogeneity across 
individual players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make 25% lower bids, 
their bids have lower variance, and group bids are less heterogeneous than individual bids. 
Therefore, groups receive significantly higher and more homogeneous payoffs than individuals. 
We elicit individual and group preferences towards risk using simple lotteries. The results 
indicate that groups make less risky decisions, which is a possible explanation for lower bids in 
contests. Most importantly, we find that groups learn to make lower bids from communication 
and negotiation between group members. 
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1. Introduction 
Contests are competitive games in which players make bids in order to win a prize. 
Examples include rent-seeking contests, R&D competitions between firms, and patent races. It is 
well documented that in most contest experiments subjects overbid relative to theoretical 
predictions, which is inconsistent with empirical evidence from the field. This inconsistency may 
be explained by the fact that firms use groups, instead of individuals, to determine their bidding 
strategies. While previous experimental studies employ only individuals, we examine whether 
groups can make “more rational” decisions than individuals in a contest experiment. We refer to 
a more rational decision as a decision that is closer to theoretical predictions.1 
The phenomenon of over-bidding was first discovered in an experimental contest study 
by Millner and Pratt (1989, 1991) and it has been further replicated by many other experiments. 
As a result of over-bidding, most subjects, on average, receive negative payoffs (Davis and 
Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta, 2009b). Moreover, contrary to the 
theoretical prediction of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, experimental studies document 
that individual bids are distributed on the entire strategy space, and even aggregate individual 
behavior is heterogeneous (Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 
1998; Parco et al., 2005). 
The findings of experimental studies are hard to reconcile with some of the empirical 
evidence from the field. In particular, Hazlett and Michaels (1993) estimate that, in FCC 
lotteries, total firm expenditures account for only 38% of the final prize value, suggesting that 
firms do not over-bid in lottery contests. The crucial difference between lab experiments and 
                                                 
1 In contests, over-bidding leads to lower payoffs, while more rational (or equilibrium) bidding leads to higher 
payoffs. Therefore, in a sense a “more rational” decision may also be interpreted as a “better” decision because it 
results in higher payoffs. 
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lottery contests in the field is that lab experiments use individual bidders while many firms 
assemble groups such as teams of experts and committees to determine the bidding strategies 
(Hoffman et al., 1991; Borgers and Dustmann, 2005).2 
This study reports an experiment that examines whether groups can make more rational 
decisions than individuals in lottery contests. We study a simple lottery contest as in Tullock 
(1980). In the first treatment individuals, while in the second treatment groups, are competing for 
a prize in a lottery contest. More specifically, a single bid is submitted by a group of two subjects 
after they exchange free-form text messages in a chat window for one minute. This distinguishes 
our study from other studies with exogenous group decision rules, i.e. the average of the group 
members’ bids in Cox and Hayne (2005), the sum of the group members’ bids in Ahn et al. 
(2009), and the best-shot or weakest-link in Sheremeta (2009c). The results of the experiment 
indicate that although groups still overbid relative to the Nash equilibrium, groups indeed make 
more rational decisions than individuals: groups make 25% lower bids, bids have less variance, 
and groups are less heterogeneous. As a result, groups receive significantly higher and more 
homogeneous payoffs than individuals. A possible explanation for these findings is that groups 
make less risky decisions than individuals. Most importantly, we find that groups learn to make 
lower bids from communication and negotiation between group members. 
Our results contribute to at least three research areas. First, our study contributes to the 
discussion on why there is over-bidding in contests. Over the last decade a number of studies 
have offered different explanations. The first common explanation is that most subjects are likely 
to make mistakes (Potters et al., 1998). These mistakes add noise to the Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
2 The empirical evidence from the field is not as consistent as the experimental evidence. While some studies report 
under-expenditures in the field (Hazlett and Michaels, 1993), one may find anecdotal evidence that point out to 
over-expenditures in the field contests. For example, the European pro-league football clubs are often left in turmoil 
and near bankrupt due to very high expenditures. 
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solution and thus may cause over-bidding in contests. Several studies have provided support for 
this argument (Goeree et al., 2002; Schmidt et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2009a). A second 
explanation for over-bidding is based on the observation that most subjects are not risk-neutral 
(Cox et al., 1988). In a theoretical model, Hillman and Katz (1984) show that risk-seeking 
players make higher bids than risk-neutral players. This theory is supported by three independent 
contest experiments (Miller and Pratt, 1991; Schmidt et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2009a), which 
show that subjects who are more willing to take risks make substantially higher bids in lottery 
contests.3 Our results are consistent with these two explanations. Groups perform better than 
individuals because groups make less risky decisions and they reduce individual mistakes 
through group communication. 
Second, our results contribute to the literature investigating means by which over-bidding 
in contests can be reduced. So far, experimental economists have found that over-bidding 
decreases with the repetition (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006). 
Therefore, one way to reduce over-bidding is to allow economic agents to gain experience over 
time. This does not solve the problem of over-bidding for inexperienced contestants, though. 
Another way to reduce over-bidding is to constrain individual endowments (Parco et al, 2005; 
Sheremeta, 2009a). However, in the world of competitive capital markets money is relatively 
easy to borrow and thus it is very unlikely that such constraints will be imposed (D’Avolio, 
2002). Our results suggest that letting groups, instead of individuals, make bids in lottery 
contests is an effective way to reduce over-bidding. 
Finally, our study contributes to the discussion on whether groups are more rational than 
individuals. Recent experimental studies have shown that depending on the environment groups 
                                                 
3 Other studies also suggest such explanations as misperception of probabilities (Sheremeta, 2009a), judgmental 
biases (Baharad and Nitzan, 2008), and a non-monetary utility of winning (Parco et al, 2005; Sheremeta, 2009b). 
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can be either more or less successful in solving economic problems than individuals. For 
example, Cooper and Kagel (2005) show that groups consistently make more strategic decisions 
than individuals in a repeated signaling game, where an incumbent monopolist attempts to deter 
entry by signaling. Casari et al. (2009) find that groups perform better than individuals in 
handling the winner’s curse problem in the context of the company takeover game. 4 On the other 
hand, in a common value auction, Cox and Hayne (2006) document that groups bid more 
competitively than individuals which leads to significantly lower profits. Sutter et al. (2009) also 
report that groups stay longer in an ascending sealed-bid English auction, bid higher, and thus 
make fewer profits than individuals. 5  Relying on previous experimental findings on group 
decision making, it is not obvious whether in lottery contests group behavior will be closer to 
standard game-theoretic predictions than individual behavior. Our study contributes to this 
discussion by explicitly examining group versus individual decision making in a laboratory 
experiment and we find that in lottery contests groups make more rational discussions than 
individuals. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Charness et al. (2007) compare individual and group decision making under risk and find that groups make 
substantially fewer errors than individuals. Charness et al. (2008) report that groups fall less to the conjunction 
fallacy in probability judgment. Groups are also better in processing information in “letters to numbers” problem 
and beauty-contest games (Stasser and Dietz-Uhler, 2001; Laughlin et al., 2002, 2003; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; 
Sutter, 2005, 2007). 
5 Previous studies have offered insights on why groups perform worse than individuals in some environments. Kerr 
et al. (1996), for example, find that groups may amplify rather than suppress judgmental biases. Group decisions 
also depend critically on the procedure in which the experiment is conducted (Brady and Wu, 2008). In some 
experiments, groups make poor decisions even when the group is composed of highly capable individuals. This is 
mainly because interactions within a group result in distraction and process losses (Davis, 1992; Laughlin, 1996; 
Steiner, 1972). 
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2. Theoretical Model 
In a simple lottery contest 𝑁 identical risk-neutral players are competing for a prize of 
value 𝑉. Each player 𝑖 chooses his bid, 𝑏𝑖, to win the prize. The probability that a player 𝑖 wins 
the prize, 𝑝𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏−𝑖), is given by the lottery contest success function: 
𝑝𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏−𝑖) =
𝑏𝑖
∑ 𝑏𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
.         (1) 
That is, the probability of winning depends on own bid relative to the sum of all bids. 
This lottery contest success function is commonly used in most of the theoretical contest 
literature (Tullock, 1980), including virtually all of the experimental contest literature. Given (1), 
the expected payoff for player 𝑖, 𝐸(𝜋𝑖), can be written as 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏−𝑖)𝑉 − 𝑏𝑖.        (2) 
That is, the probability of winning the prize, 𝑝𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝑏−𝑖), times the value of the prize, 𝑉, 
minus the bid, 𝑏𝑖. Differentiating (2) with respect to 𝑏𝑖 and accounting for the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium leads to a classical solution (Tullock, 1980), 
𝑏∗ =
(𝑁−1)
𝑁2
𝑉.          (3) 
The equilibrium bid (3) is increasing in the prize value and decreasing in the number of 
players. It is important to emphasize that Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Cornes and 
Hartley (2005) have proved that this equilibrium is unique. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our experiment consists of two different treatments. In the Individual treatment there are 
4 individual players (𝑁 = 4) competing with each other for a prize with a value of 120 (𝑉 = 120). 
From (3), the unique equilibrium bid is 22.5. The expected payoff of such a contest is 7.5. The 
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Group treatment is exactly the same as Individual treatment except that, instead of 4 individual 
players, 4 pairs of players compete with each other for a prize of 120. We refer to a pair of 
individuals as a group hereafter. 
The experiment involved 108 undergraduate subjects from Purdue University. The 
computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We ran 3 
sessions in the Individual treatment (36 subjects) and 3 sessions in the Group treatment (72 
subjects). Each session in the Individual treatment included a total of 12 subjects and the session 
proceeded in two parts: part 1a and part 2a. Instructions, available in Appendix, were given to 
subjects at the beginning of each part and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. In part 1a, 
subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002).6 At the end of the 
session we randomly selected 1 out of 15 decisions for payment. This method was used to elicit 
subjects’ risk preferences. In part 2a, each subject played a lottery contest for 30 periods. In each 
period subjects were randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 4 players. Subjects were 
randomly re-grouped after each period. At the beginning of each period, subjects were given an 
endowment of 120 experimental francs and were asked to make a bid for a prize of 120 francs. 
All subjects were informed that by increasing their bids, they would increase their chances of 
winning and regardless of who wins the prize all subjects would have to pay their bids. After all 
subjects submitted their bids, the computer chose the winner by implementing a simple lottery 
rule: the chance of receiving the prize is calculated by the number of francs a subject bids 
divided by the total number of francs all 4 subjects in the group bid. In case all subjects bid zero, 
the prize was randomly assigned to one of the four subjects in the group. At the end of each 
                                                 
6 Subjects were asked to state whether they preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff 
with certainty, while option B yielded a payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across 
all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered a 5% chance of winning $3 and a 95% chance of winning $0, while the last 
lottery offered a 70% chance of winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. 
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period, the sum of all bids in the group and personal period earnings were reported to all 
subjects. After completing all 30 decision periods, 5 periods were randomly selected for payment 
in part 2a. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 60 francs to $1. On average, 
subjects earned $17 each and this was paid in cash. The experimental sessions lasted for about 50 
minutes. 
In each session with the Group treatment there were a total of 24 subjects (12 pairs) and 
the session proceeded in two parts: part 1b and part 2b. In part 1b, subjects were randomly 
divided into pairs and were asked to make 15 choices in simple lotteries. Hence there were 12 
pairs in each session. Following the procedure in Zhang and Casari (2009), after exchanging 
proposals and free-form text messages with each other, each pair had up to three rounds to reach 
an agreement for each of the 15 choices. We paid for only 1 of the 15 decisions, chosen 
randomly at the end of the session. 
In part 2b, subjects faced the lottery contest for 30 periods and were asked to make their 
decisions in pairs. Pairs were the same as in part 1b and all players stayed in the same pairs for 
all 30 periods. After each period, we randomly re-grouped different pairs to form a group of 4 
pairs. Every period had a proposal phase, a chat phase, and a bidding phase. All players initially 
made a bid proposal. The bid proposals were then displayed for both pair members to see. At that 
point, players could chat for one minute after which they submitted a bid for the pair decision. If 
both players from the same pair made the same bid, then it became a pair bid. Otherwise, both 
players had another minute to chat and after that they submitted their final bids. If there was still 
disagreement, the pair lost the endowment of 120 francs and the pair bid was replaced with a bid 
made by a randomly selected pair in a different session (this happened only once in the entire 
experiment). After completing all 30 decision periods, 5 periods were randomly selected for 
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payment in part 2b. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the rate of 30 francs to $1 
and these earnings were split equally between two group members (so that the effective 
conversion rate was 60 francs to $1 as in the Individual treatment). On average, subjects earned 
$22 each and the experiment session lasted for about 90 minutes.7 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Individuals versus Groups 
Table 4.1 summarizes average bids, payoffs, and dissipation rates in Individual and 
Group treatments. Overall, subjects in both treatments overbid relative to the risk-neutral Nash 
equilibrium. Dissipation rates, defined as the ratio of the total sum of bids to the value of the 
prize, are significantly greater than the predictions (for both treatments p-value < 0.05).8 Bids 
made in the first period in both treatments are significantly different from the theory as shown by 
a Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (p-value < 0.05 for Individual treatment and p-value = 0.06 for the 
Group treatment). 
Table 4.1 – Average Statistics 
Treatment Individual Group Equilibrium 
Average Bid 43.8 (1.07) 32.8 (0.91) 22.5 
Average Payoff -13.8 (1.58) -3.1 (1.49) 7.5 
Dissipation Rate 1.46 (0.04) 1.09 (0.03) 0.75 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses 
  
The main question we pose in this study is whether groups make more rational decisions 
than individuals. The lottery contest that we study has systematic over-bidding, and thus more 
                                                 
7 We gave subjects a higher show up fee in the Group treatment than the Individual treatment to compensate for 
longer experimental sessions. 
8 We estimated a random effect model, with individual subjects random effects and standard errors clustered at the 
session level, on a constant separately for each treatment. Then we tested whether the constant coefficients are equal 
to the predicted theoretical values as in Table 4.1. We found that these differences are significant for both treatments 
(p-value < 0.05). 
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rational decisions correspond to lower bids.9 From Table 4.1, we can see that groups on average 
bid 32.8 while individuals bid 43.8 (a difference of 25%). This difference is significant based on 
the estimation of a random effect model with standard errors clustered at the session level, where 
the dependent variable is the bid and the independent variables are a period trend and a treatment 
dummy-variable (p-value < 0.05). 
Result 1. Groups make 25% lower bids than individuals, although both groups and 
individuals significantly overbid relative to the equilibrium. As a result, groups incur fewer 
losses than individuals. 
Figure 4.1 – Average Bid over Periods 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that average individual bids are higher than average group bids over all 
periods of the experiment. As a result of significant over-bidding, average payoffs are negative. 
Individuals receive an average payoff of -13.8 and groups receive -3.1. As players become more 
                                                 
9 Note that higher bids are not the best-response to the observed over-bidding in lottery contests. 
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experienced they decrease their bids, indicating some learning. A simple regression of the bid on 
a period trend shows a significant and negative relationship (p-value < 0.05). 
Contrary to the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, both individual and group bids are 
distributed on the entire strategy space. Figure 4.2 shows that instead of a single-point 
equilibrium of 22.5, bids range from 0 to 120. A high variance in individual bids is consistent 
with previous experimental findings of the contest literature (Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; 
Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2009a, b). This puzzling observation 
produces a challenge for existing contest theory (Cornes and Hartley, 2005). Figure 4.2 also 
shows that group bids are significantly less dispersed than individual bids. We can reject the 
equality of two distributions based on a standard F-test and Levene's robust test for the equality 
of variances (p-value < 0.05). 
Result 2. There is a substantial variance in bids, but groups have a lower bid variance 
than individuals. 
Figure 4.2 – Distribution of Bids
  
This finding contributes to the discussion on whether groups are more rational than 
individuals. In particular, Result 2 suggests that groups better comply with game theoretic 
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predictions than individuals by the fact that groups have lower bid variance. In equilibrium, of 
course, the bid variance should be zero. 
Another puzzle for contest theory comes from the observation that even aggregate 
individual behavior is heterogeneous (Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2009a). Figure 4.3 ranks 36 
individuals and 36 groups by the average bids they submitted over 30 periods. The line that 
represents groups is flatter than the line that represents individuals, indicating less heterogeneity 
across groups than across individuals. 
Result 3. There is less heterogeneity across groups than across individuals. 
Figure 4.3 – Average Bids Ranked by Individual (Group)
 
This finding also confirms the earlier observation that groups better comply with game 
theoretic predictions than individuals. Result 3 suggests that in the aggregate bidding behavior 
groups are more homogenous than individuals. At equilibrium, of course, all players should 
make identical bids. Overall, Results 1, 2, and 3 indicate that groups make more ratioanl 
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decisions than individuals in lottery contests: groups make lower bids with a smaller variance 
and groups are less heterogeneous. 
Can risk aversion explain the differences in individual and group bidding behavior in 
lottery contests? Previous theoretical and experimental studies show that higher risk-aversion 
leads to lower over-bidding in lottery contests with individual players (Hillman and Katz, 1984; 
Miller and Pratt, 1991; Schmidt et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2009a,b). In our experiment we elicited 
a measure of risk-aversion from a series of 15 lotteries. In these lotteries individuals and groups 
were given a choice between a safe option A and a risky option B (for the details see footnote 6). 
Figure 4.4 reports the fraction of risky option B chosen in 15 lotteries by the individuals 
(Individual treatment), groups (Group treatment), and the individual proposals (Group 
treatment). We find that groups make less risky lottery decisions (p-value < 0.05).10 This finding 
is consistent with several other studies that compare individual and group decision making under 
risk (Baker et al., 2008; Shupp and Williams, 2008, Masclet et al., 2009).11 
Result 4. Groups make less risky lottery decisions than individuals. 
It is also interesting to see from Figure 4.4 that when individuals make proposals in the 
Group treatment, even before any communication, they are acting as if they were more risk-
averse. This suggests that individuals correctly expect for groups to make less risky decisions. 
Although there is no significant difference comparing the distributions of individual proposals 
and final group choices, 58% of individual proposals are different from the final group choices.12 
                                                 
10 The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of two distributions. 
11 Harrison et al. (2005) reports no difference between individual and group behavior in lottery choice experiment. 
This might be due to the fact that, instead of a unanimous rule, a majority voting rule was applied. Other 
experimental studies have groups facing more challenging choices under risk. Rockenbach et al. (2007) compares 
individuals and groups in choices among alternative financial investments and find that groups accumulate 
significantly more expected value at a significantly lower total risk. Using a within-subject design, Zhang and Casari 
(2009) find that groups are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals. 
12 33 out of 36 groups reached agreement on all 15 lotteries in the first attempt. The 3 other groups who disagreed on 
one lottery choice reached agreement in the second attempt.  
 14 
In the proposal stage, 29 out of 36 groups were in disagreement. After two minutes of 
communication, one of the two proposals prevailed in 16 groups. The more risk averse subject 
conformed to the less risk averse subject in 10 groups and the less risk averse subject conformed 
to the more risk averse subject in 6 groups. In the other 10 groups, two subjects reached a 
compromise by choosing the average of the two proposals. 
Figure 4.4 – Choices of Individuals and Groups in Lotteries13 
 
It is important to emphasize that the differences in risk-aversion between individuals and 
groups may not be the cause for the differences in bids (Cox et al., 1988; Berg et al., 2005). To 
see whether risk-aversion correlates with the decisions made in the lottery contest we conduct a 
multivariate analysis. Table 4.2 reports the estimation results of three random effect models, 
where the dependent variable is a bid made by either an individual or a group. All regressions 
                                                 
13 Figure 4.4 includes non-monotonic lottery choices, i.e. more than one switching point from A to B. Individual 
decisions are 94.4% monotonic. Individual proposals in the group treatment are 93.1% monotonic. Group choices 
are 100% monotonic (this again is an indication of groups being more rational than individuals).  
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include dummy variables to capture session and treatment effects (not shown in the table). To 
allow for time effects we include a period trend. The independent lagged variables are designed 
to capture the dynamic nature of the experiment. 
 
Table 4.2 – Determinants of Individual and Group Bids 
Dependent variable, bid Individual  Group Individual+Group  
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
bid-lag 0.61** 0.54** 0.61** 
    [bid in period t-1] (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
win-lag 1.02 6.97** 1.02 
    [1 if win in t-1] (2.14) (1.90) (1.99) 
otherbid-lag 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    [sum of opponents' bids in period t-1] (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Period -0.18 -0.09 -0.18 
    [period trend] (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
risk-averse 1.31 -0.02 1.31 
    [number of risky options B < 7] (1.86) (2.19) (1.73) 
risk-seeking 9.31** 3.26 9.31** 
    [number of risky options B > 8] (3.11) (3.29) (2.89) 
Group × bid-lag 
  
-0.07 
 
  
(0.04) 
Group × win-lag 
  
5.95* 
 
  
(2.87) 
Group × otherbid-lag 
  
-0.01 
 
  
(0.02) 
Group × period 
  
0.09 
 
  
(0.14) 
Group × risk-averse 
  
-1.33 
 
  
(2.94) 
Group × risk-seeking 
  
-6.04 
   
(4.60) 
Observations 1044 1044 2088 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
Specifications (1) and (2) use the data from the Individual and Group treatments, while 
specification (3) uses pooled data from both treatments. All models include a random 
effects error structure, with the individual subject effects. We also include dummies to 
control for session and treatment effects. 
 
Consistent with previous experimental findings, specifications (1) and (3) indicate that 
risk-aversion elicited from lotteries has significant influence on bidding behavior of individuals. 
Risk-seeking individuals make higher bids than risk-averse individuals. On the other hand, risk-
aversion does not have a significant effect on bidding behavior of groups (specifications 2 and 
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3). 14  Another interesting finding from Table 4.2 is that a win-lag variable is positive and 
significant for groups (specifications 2 and 3). This variable takes a value of 1 if individual or 
group won the contest in period t-1 and 0 otherwise. One interpretation of this finding might be a 
“hot hand” phenomenon, documented in the gambling literature. The idea is based on the 
observation that gamblers hold beliefs in a positive autocorrelation of a non-autocorrelated 
random sequence (Gilovich et al., 1985; Chau and Phillips, 1995; Croson and Sundali, 2005). In 
our experiment, the random draws made by the computer in each period are not correlated.15 
However, as we can see from Table 4.2, groups place higher bids in period t if they won in 
period t-1. This might be due to the fact that groups pay more attention to the history of the play 
as they discuss about the details of the game during the chat period. The information about 
winning in the last period may be a misleading distraction which makes groups fall prey to the 
“hot hand” phenomenon more often than individuals.16 
 
4.2. Group Decision Making 
So far we have documented that individuals and groups make different decisions in 
lottery contests, with groups making more rational decisions. How do groups reach their 
decisions? In the Group treatment, two subjects from the same group initially made two bid 
proposals. The average maximum (top black line) and the average minimum (bottom grey line) 
                                                 
14 This finding is surprising because one would expect groups to make more consistent decisions across institutions, 
which would imply strong correlation between risk-aversion and bids. However, our findings suggest that group 
behavior may be less consistent across various institutions than individual behavior. 
15  Subjects understand this well as 91% of them correctly answered all quiz questions about the instructions, 
including the question about the random draw. 
16 For a robustness test, we re-estimated Table 4.2 excluding the bid-lag and win-lag variables. As a result, in 
specifications 1 and 3, we found that the period variable is significant. Intuitively, this indicates that the period 
variable is capturing some of the dynamic effects of bid-lag and win-lag. Moreover, we found that the significance 
of the risk-averse variable is reduced (p-values are 0.10 and 0.06 in specifications 1 and 3). This indicates that risk 
aversion plays more important role when subjects look back into the previous periods and update their beliefs about 
bidding strategies accordingly. 
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proposals are shown in Figure 4.5. As the experiment proceeds the gap between the proposals 
narrows down. In the first two periods the gap is around 19 experimental francs while in the last 
two periods it is reduced to 7. Intuitively, the more often two players interact with each other, the 
more similar their proposal bids become. 
Figure 4.5 – Absolute Difference between Proposals and Bids over Periods 
 
While bid proposals were displayed for both group members to see, players had up to two 
rounds to reach a unanimous bid decision. The average maximum bids (middle black line) and 
the average minimum bids (middle grey line) are shown in Figure 4.5. As expected, the two lines 
overlap, with only 0.1% disagreement.17 Most disagreement occurred in first five periods (37%) 
and last five periods (21%) of the experiment.  
                                                 
17 If both players from the same pair disagreed on their pair bid, they had another one minute to chat after which 
they submitted their final bids. Throughout the entire experiment we had only one decision which resulted in final 
disagreement. The reason for such strong agreement among pair members is that in our experiment disagreement 
was very costly. A pair in disagreement had to forfeit their endowment of 120 francs and the pair bid was then 
replaced with a bid made by a randomly selected pair in a different session. 
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Proposal 
(Bid)
Period
Max proposals Min proposals
Max bid Min bid
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Next, we look at how group members reach their decisions in case of a disagreement in 
their initial proposals. Do group members take turns to determine their final bids or do they take 
the average of the two proposals? On aggregate, 74.3% of the final bids are equal to one of the 
two proposals. Yet some times, one member is more persuasive than the other. For example, in 3 
out of 36 groups, one member was always able to convince the other member to choose her 
proposal as the final bid. In other instances, subjects took turns to determine their final bids: in 
13 groups, one member’s proposal prevailed between 40% and 60% of the time, and one group 
took exact 50-50 turn. Finally, 37.4% of time, group members reached a compromise by making 
a final bid which was very close to the average of the two proposals.18 This shows that group 
members apply different strategies in determining their final bids. To further see how groups 
reach their decisions, we estimate the following “bargaining” equation (Cason and Mui, 1997): 
𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑏𝑖𝑡(max) + 𝛼2𝑏𝑖𝑡(min) + 𝑡 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖
35
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
                    
,    (4) 
where 𝑏𝑖𝑡  denotes the bid made by the 𝑖 th group, and individual bid proposals are ordered 
𝑏𝑖𝑡(max) ≥ 𝑏𝑖𝑡(min). We also include period trend 𝑡 to control for learning and dummy-variables 
𝑑𝑖 to control for individual group effects. 
Estimates of model (4), over different periods of experiment, are shown in Table 4.3. In 
the very first period of the experiment the group bid responds mainly to the lower proposal 
(specification 1). We can reject the hypothesis that 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 (p-value < 0.05). As we move from 
specification (1) to (2) and then to (3), we see that 𝛼1 increases and 𝛼2 decreases. At the end of 
the experiment the group bid responds mainly to the higher proposal (specification 4). We can 
reject the hypothesis that 𝛼1 = 𝛼2  (p-value = 0.07). Although the group bids depend on the 
                                                 
18 To count for the cases where final group bids are very close to the average of the two proposals, we used a 
deviation of 2 francs. 
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higher proposals (𝛼1 > 𝛼2) in later periods, the group bids are still lower than the individual bids 
because the higher proposals decrease over the periods and become more similar to the lower 
proposals. 
Table 4.3 – Estimates of Group Bargaining Equation 
Dependent variable, bid Period  1 Period  1-5 Period  6-24 Period  25-30 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
α0 8.39 -4.56 -5.38 27.78 
    [constant] (6.74) (4.89) (3.59) (36.73) 
α1 0.23 0.50** 0.65** 0.78** 
    [maximum among two proposals] (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) 
α2 0.87** 0.58** 0.37** 0.29 
    [minimum among two proposals] (0.14) (0.19) (0.08) (0.15) 
period 
 
1.27 0.28 -1.31 
    [period trend]   (0.94) (0.23) (1.38) 
p-value 0.01 0.80 0.08 0.07 
Observations 33 129 272 83 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% 
  
Overall, the estimation results shown in Table 4.2 suggest that groups learn to reduce 
their bids at the very beginning of the experiment.19 This may explain why there is a large 
difference between the average group bids and individual bids even in the first periods of the 
experiment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Previous experiments have documented that individual players significantly overbid 
relative to theoretical predictions, bids exhibit a high variance, and strong heterogeneity exists 
across individual players. We designed an experiment to see whether groups can make more 
rational decisions than individuals in lottery contests. The answer is yes. We find that group 
                                                 
19 In beauty contest games, Kocher and Sutter (2005) and Kocher et al. (2006) also document that groups learn faster 
than individuals and thus outperform individuals.  
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behavior is significantly different from individual behavior: groups make lower bids with a 
smaller variance and there is less heterogeneity across groups. 
We explore several possible explanations for a better group performance. First, we find 
that groups make less risky decisions than individuals, which is consistent with other studies. 
Risk-aversion, however, is not a significant determinant of group bids in lottery contests. 
Second, and probably the most important explanation is that groups learn to make lower bids 
from communication and negotiation between group members. To support this argument we 
estimate a bargaining model, where the dependent variable is a group bid and the independent 
variables are maximum and minimum bids proposed by group members. We find that in the first 
few periods of the experiment group bids respond mainly to the minimum proposals, which 
results in lower group bids even at the very beginning of the experiment. Our study contributes 
to the discussion on whether groups are more rational than individuals. In contrast to Cox and 
Hayne (2006) and Sutter et al. (2009), we find that group behavior is closer to standard game-
theoretic predictions than individual behavior. The differences in results might be due to several 
factors. First, the lottery contests, as in our study, are much simpler than the common value 
auctions, as in the other two studies. Groups thus have a chance to learn faster than individuals in 
our game. Second, we have a smaller group size (group of 2) relative to groups of 5, as in Cox 
and Hayne (2006), and groups of 3, as in Sutter et al. (2009). Finally, the other two studies use 
face to face communication, instead of free-form chat communication. Without control for 
anonymity, subjects may care more about in-group members’ perceptions on what is socially 
favorable and may be more likely to compromise to majority’s opinion in the group due to the 
conformity pressure (Cialdini et. al., 2004). 
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The findings of our study can also help to reconcile the difference between experimental 
findings of Millner and Pratt (1989, 1991) and empirical findings in the field of Hazlett and 
Michaels (1993). It might be the case that in reality firms do not over-bid in lottery contests as 
often as the lab experiments predict simply because in reality firms use groups, instead of 
individuals, to determine their bidding strategies. Finally, our study reveals important insights on 
how groups reach their decisions (Kiesler and Lee, 1992). 
There are several possible extensions to our study. First, groups with more members are 
found to outperform groups with fewer members (Sutter, 2005). Therefore, it would be 
interesting to see whether this holds in our study. Second, Brady and Wu (2008) show that the 
direction and magnitude of the decisions made by groups depend on the procedure by which 
groups reach their final decisions. This suggests further research on group decision making by 
implementing alternative experimental procedures such as aggregation rules (majority rule 
versus dictator rule), communication structures (one way versus two way communication), and 
forms of communication (face to face versus chat form). 
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Appendix – Instructions for Group Treatment 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them closely and make appropriate 
decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. 
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is 
U.S. Dollars. The currency used in Part 2 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a 
rate of _30_ francs to _1_ dollar. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 24 
participants are in today’s experiment. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any 
questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, 
laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your 
cooperation. At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1 
In this part of the experiment you will be paired with another participant and you will be asked to make a 
series of choices as a pair in decision problems. How much your pair receives will depend partly on chance and 
partly on the choices your pair makes. 
Please look at the table in the next page. For each line, you and your pair counterpart will be asked to 
choose either option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be 
randomly selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention to the 
choice you make in every line. After you have completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a 
bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15. The token number determines which line is going to be paid. 
Your pair earnings for the selected line depend on which option your pair chose. If your pair chose option 
A in that line, your pair will receive $2. If your pair chose option B in that line, your pair will receive either $6 or 
$0. To determine your earnings in the case your pair chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will 
be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage now containing twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number 
is then compared with the numbers in the line selected (see the table). If the token number shows up in the left 
column your pair earns $6. If the token number shows up in the right column your pair earns $0. 
Since you will have to make your decisions as the pair there will be several stages. On the first screen, you 
will input your proposals for the 15 decisions for your counterpart to see on his or her screen. When you click 
“Submit,” all proposals of your counterpart will be posted on the screen for you to see. From the screen you will see 
if your counterpart made the same or different proposals. 
At this point, you will be able to send messages to your counterpart. To see how, please click now on the 
messenger tab in the lower portion of your screen. The messenger window will open. Then click on the lower 
(white) part of the box and type “hello”. Please everyone type “hello” now. Then click the ‘Send’ button, so that 
your counterpart can read your message. If you look at the messenger window you will see how many seconds 
remain for exchanging messages. The messenger window will be active for two minutes during the task when you 
start to make decisions for money. Now please switch to the main window by clicking on the background. 
Although we will record the messages you send to each other, only you and your counterpart will see them. 
In sending messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) Be civil to one another and do not use profanities, and 
(2) Do not identify yourself in any manner. The communication channel is intended to discuss your choices and 
should be used that way. 
It is very important that you do not close any window at any time because that will cause delays and 
problems with the software. If you like, you can simply wait without sending any message, although the messages 
may help you to agree on a common choice for the pair.  
After the exchange of messages, you will make your choices of A or B for the pair and then press the 
‘Submit’ button. If both pair members made the same choice in all decisions, those will be the pair decisions. If 
some choices are different, you will be able to revise them in a second round. During the second round you will be 
able to send messages to your counterpart again. The messenger window will be active for another two minutes. 
After the exchange of messages, you will make your final choices of A or B for the pair. If the pair does not reach 
unanimity in the second round, the pair may lose the opportunity to earn money. More precisely, if a decision 
with disagreement is randomly selected for payment, the pair will earn zero. 
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At the very end of part 1, remember to record the final pair decisions in the table on the next page. For each 
decision, state whether the pair agreed on option A, option B, or whether there was still disagreement by the second 
round. Are there any questions? 
Participant ID _________ 
 
Decision 
No. 
Option 
A 
Option 
B 
Please 
choose 
A or B 
1 $2 $6   never 
$0   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13, 
       14,15, 16,17,18,19,20 
 
2 $2 $6   if 1 comes out of the bingo cage 
$0   if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
3 $2 $6   if 1 or 2 comes out 
$0   if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
4 $2 $6   if 1,2, or 3 
$0   if  4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15, 
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
5 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4 
$0   if  5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
6 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4,5 
$0   if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
7 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4,5,6 
$0   if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
8 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
$0   if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
9 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 
$0   if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,  
       16,17,18,19,20 
 
10 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 $0   if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
11 $2 $6   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 $0   if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
12 $2 $6   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 $0   if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
13 $2 $6   if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 $0   if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
14 $2 $6   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 $0   if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20  
15 $2 
$6   if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10  
       11,12,13,14 
$0   if 15,16,17,18,19,20  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 
DECISION 
At the beginning of the second part of the experiment you will be paired with the same participant as in part 
1. The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. You and your counterpart will stay in 
the same pair for all 30 periods. At the beginning of each period, your pair will be randomly and anonymously 
placed into a group of 4 pairs. The composition of your group will be changed randomly every period. That is, each 
period you will be randomly re-grouped with three other pairs to from a four-pair group. Each period, your pair and 
the other three pairs in your group will be given an initial endowment of 120 francs. Your pair will use this 
endowment to bid for a reward. The reward is worth 120 francs to your pair and the other three pairs in your group. 
Your pair may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 120 (including 0.5 decimal points). An example of 
your pair decision screen is shown below. 
 
Decision Screen 
 
YOUR PAIR EARNINGS 
After all pairs have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be 
converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is one of the five periods that is 
randomly chosen for payment. If your pair receives the reward your pair period earnings are equal to your pair 
endowment plus the reward minus your pair bid. If your pair does not receive the reward your pair period earnings 
are equal to your pair endowment minus your pair bid. 
If your pair receives the reward:     
 Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Pair Bid = 120 + 120 – Your Pair Bid 
If you do not receive the reward:     
 Earnings = Endowment – Your Pair Bid = 120 – Your Pair Bid 
 
The more your pair bids, the more likely your pair is to receive the reward. The more the other pairs in your 
group bid, the less likely your pair is to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc your pair bids your pair will 
receive one lottery ticket. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets 
purchased by 4 pairs in the group, including your pair. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 120 
francs. Thus, your pair chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs your pair bids divided by the 
total number of francs all 4 pairs in your group bid.   
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Chance of receiving the reward = 
Your Pair Bid 
sum of all 4 Pair Bids in your group 
In case all pairs bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the four pairs in the group.  
 
Example of the Random Draw 
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say pair 
1 bids 10 francs, pair 2 bids 15 francs, pair 3 bids 0 francs, and pair 4 bids 40 francs. Therefore, the computer 
assigns 10 lottery tickets to pair 1, 15 lottery tickets to pair 2, 0 lottery tickets to pair 3, and 40 lottery tickets for pair 
4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, pair 4 has the 
highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. Pair 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, pair 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 
chance, and pair 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance of receiving the reward. 
After all pairs make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide which pair 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your pair period earnings based on your pair bid and whether 
your pair received the reward or not. 
At the end of each period, your pair bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether your pair received the 
reward or not, and your pair earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the 
outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the 
appropriate heading. 
 
Outcome Screen 
 
PAIR DECISION 
Since you will have to make your bids as the pair there will be several stages. On the first screen, you will 
propose a bid for your counterpart to see on his or her screen. When you click “Submit,” the proposed bid of your 
counterpart will be posted on the screen for you to see. From the screen you will see if your counterpart made the 
same or different proposed bid. 
At this point you will be able to send messages to your counterpart. You should be already familiar with 
this tool. If you click on the messenger tab, the messenger window will open. In each period, the messenger window 
will be active for one minute. You can switch to the main window by clicking on the background. Please do not 
close any window at any time because that will cause delays and problems with the software. The messages may 
help you to agree on a common bid for your pair. You neither earn nor lose francs by sending messages.  
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After the exchange of messages you will choose the bid you want for the pair and then press the SUBMIT 
button. If you and your counterpart chose an identical bid, that amount will be the pair bid. If the bid amounts are 
different, you will be able to revise your bid in a second round. During the second round you will be able to send 
messages to your counterpart again. The messenger window will be active for another one minute. After the 
exchange of messages, you will make your final bid in the second round. If you and your counterpart do not 
reach unanimity in the second round, your pair loses the endowment of 120 francs and your pair loses the 
opportunity to place a bid for the period. In this case, the computer will randomly select a bid made by a different 
pair which has reached a unanimous decision in the same type of experiment which we ran last week. You may 
think of this as if the computer substitutes your pair with a different pair which has reached a unanimous decision. 
The other three pairs in your group are automatically matched with this different pair. Therefore, in case of 
disagreement your pair will not participate in the experiment for that period and your pair will always earn zero for 
the period. 
 
IMPORTANT NOTES 
 You and your counterpart will stay in the same pair for all 30 periods. At the beginning of each period your 
pair will be randomly re-grouped with three other pairs to from a four-pair group. Your pair can never guarantee 
itself the reward. However, by increasing your pair bid, your pair can increase your pair chance of receiving the 
reward. Regardless of which pair receives the reward, all pairs will have to pay their bids. 
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment in Part 2 
using a bingo cage. You will sum the total pair earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar 
payment. Your total pair earnings will be split in half between you and your counterpart and will be paid in cash at 
the end of the experiment. Are there any questions?  
 
